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The paper includes an in-depth analysis of MGM Resorts International stock and provides 
information reasonably sufficient upon which to base an investment decision. The analysts intend 
to add value to a potential MGM Resorts International investor by including a price target as a result 
of the company’s detailed valuation, full and comprehensive analysis of the company, its sector and 
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Neutral Rating: Our coverage of MGM Resorts International 
converges to a Hold rating, as we estimate a price target of $34.77 
(implicit 4.4% upside). The valuation implies an EV/EBITDA 
multiple of 11.4x, ranking MGM below industry averages.  Despite 
recognizing the growth potential of MGM, the current level of 
uncertainty leads us to recommend investors to wait and see how 
the company and industry perform in the next few months. 
 
• As economic growth appears to slow down, the gambling sector 
demonstrated a poor performance in Las Vegas and Macau, 
hurting MGM’s L4L growth in 2019, compensated by the 
successful ramp-up of new resorts and casinos. 
 
• We recognize the potential of entering the Japanese gambling 
market and the promising JV with GVC on the online gambling 
front, but both opportunities seem to be in too early of a 
development stage to accurately incorporate in the valuation. 
 
• Despite confidence of the management in fully executing 
MGM2020, we are reticent of a full target meeting. 
 
• We estimate revenue to grow at 3.5% CAGR 2019-2027 - 
boosted by the growth of the Macanese segment MGM Cotai 
ramps-up – converging to a 28.1% EBITDA margin. After the 
recent strong investment, we expect Capex to shrink and tending 
to stabilize at c.8% revenue, improving CF generation. LT ROIC is 
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MGM Resorts International owns and 
operates a portfolio of casino resorts, 
offering gambling amenities, hotel services, 
food and beverage, entertainment and other 
related services. The company is present 
internationally - in the United States of 
America and Macau. 
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MGM Resorts International, or simply MGM, is a Delaware based company, 
established in 1986, that owns and operates a portfolio of casino resorts, offering 
gambling amenities, hotel services, food and beverage, entertainment and other 
related services. In 2009, MGM was not far from bankruptcy but has since 
deleveraged considerably through a mixture of recapitalization, earnings growth 
in the U.S and Macau (Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China) and refinancing as rates fell. 
The company is present internationally - in the United States of America and 
Macau. MGM set foot in the Asian market in 2007, with an 50% stake in joint 
venture that originated MGM China Holdings Limited. MGM China reached the 
public markets in June 2011, and the holding has, since then, increased its 
position to c.56%. All in all, MGM Resorts International actively manages 16 
resorts within the U.S. and 2 resorts in Macau.  
 
Owned by MGM
Las Vegas: Bellagio, MGM 
Grand, Circus Circus 
Regional: MGM Springfield 
Owned by MGP 
Las Vegas: Mandalay Bay,
Luxor,Mirage, Excalibur, The
Park, New York-New York,
Park MGM
Regional: MGM Grand
Detroit, Beau Rivage, Gold
Strike Tunica, Borgata, MGM
National Harbor, Empire City








NYSE: MGP HKSE: 2282 HK
Triple Net Lease Partnership







Sports Betting Venture with
GVC
LV Arena (42.5%)
Venture with AEG and
Athena Arena, LLC




MGM can be further segmented geographically, reporting three main channels of 
operation: Las Vegas, Regional (all other domestic operations) and MGM China. 
The differentiation within American territory arises from the special gaming 
environment and context of the state of Nevada compared to the other forty-nine 
states. Despite the U.S casino operations featuring a similar structure (with an 
identical mix of slots and table games), the particularity and magnitude of the Las 
Vegas gambling industry, as well as the different weight of non-casino operations 
in the overall turnover, justify the distinction. MGM China’s operations consist on 
the MGM Macau resort and casino, and on the recently launched integrated 
casino, hotel and entertainment resort on the Cotai Strip in Macau – MGM Cotai. 
Figure 2: Revenue breakdown by Operation LTM 
Source: Company Filings 
 
Figure 1: MGM Structure – Consolidated and Unconsolidated Affiliates 













Las Vegas – c.50% of Adjusted EBITDA1: MGM is the largest employer in the 
state of Nevada, employing more than 55.000 people, and the most dominant 
gaming operator on the Las Vegas Strip, by number of real estate assets. The LV 
landscape results from strategic mergers in the 2000s – with Mirage Resorts and 
with Mandalay Bay Group. The asset portfolio currently accounts for eight 
casinos and resorts owned and operated by the group, after the announcement 
of the sale-leaseback of the iconic Bellagio Resort & Casino to Blackstone. 
Furthermore, in 2009, MGM has started CityCenter Holdings – a 50% Joint-
Venture with Dubai World – which assets currently consist on Aria and Vdara 
(both unconsolidated affiliates) and has recently developed the LV Arena (or T-
Mobile Arena), a multi-purpose indoor arena. 
Regional – c.28% of Adjusted EBITDA: Regional portfolio has considerably 
grown over the past years. Most of its assets are leaders in each market. For 
example, the Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa has a very strong presence in Atlantic 
City; MGM National Harbour is a top-notch asset in Maryland and MGM Detroit is 
the leader in the Detroit market. Similarly to Las Vegas, the Regional operations 
offer various non-casino amenities, instead of pure gambling centers, but with a 
much smaller weight. Furthermore, MGM announced a joint venture with GVC to 
pursue sports betting opportunities in the US. 
Macau – c.22% of Adjusted EBITDA: MGM holds a c.56% stake of MGM China 
Holdings Limited (therefore consolidated in MGM’s accounts). MGM China rose 
as a 50% joint-venture with Pansy Ho and Stanley Ho, bringing up to life the 
MGM Grand Paradise, also referred to as MGM Macau. In 2018, the company 
launched its second integrated resort in Macau, located in the Cotai Strip – MGM 
Cotai – after an investment of over $3B. The Macanese segment is significantly 
more driven by gambling revenues, having 90% of its LTM revenue from this 
business line. 
MGP: MGM Growth Properties (MGP) is MGM’s umbrella partnership real estate 
investment trust (UPREIT). It had its IPO in 2016, currently having c.67% of its 
shares owned by the holding company. Due to the nature of the subsidiary, MGM 
has a separate board from MGM (although several of its board members are 
senior MGM executives). The UPREIT owns the majority of the group’s 
properties, having its cash-flow generated from the rental payments from the 
holding. 
In simple terms, MGM’s lease with MGP consists on a master lease under a 
triple-net structure, with MGM being responsible for paying all the operational 
expenses, insurance and property taxes. Hence, the main triple-net lease 
The Las Vegas segment 
contributes the most to 
adjusted EBITDA… 
…although the Regional and 
Macau segments have the 
most promising short/medium 
term growth potential. 
Figure 4: Regional Revenues LTM 
Source: Company Filings 
 
Figure 3: Las Vegas Revenues LTM 
Source: Company Filings 
 
 
Figure 5: Macau Revenues LTM 
Source: Company Filings 
 
1Adjusted EBITDA: EBITDA before property transactions, preopening and start-up expenses 












structure achievement is that it shifts the inherent obligations of MGP to MGM. 
For example, for an increase of property taxes on a certain year, MGP’s cash 
flow will be secured since it will be MGM the responsible for carrying the 
unexpected taxes increase. 
By creating the UPREIT, MGM managed to (i.) find easier access to capital (with 
a more liquid asset) and (ii.) create two separate financial assets for investors to 
choose from. Directly owning properties definitely has advantages to it, namely 
not depending on other parties, having no interest (lease) obligations, losing the 
ability to use the asset as collateral for financing and potentially selling the assets 
to increase liquidity, either in times of financial struggle, new opportunities to 
invest in or simply for a shift in strategy. The problem arises from the liquidity of 
real estate, considering it may take time and effort to perform a sale-lease back 
and, if the circumstances pressure the company, may lead to a poor valuation of 
the asset. By creating a REIT, after the IPO, the company owns, not the 
properties directly, but stocks of a company whose whole business is having the 
properties. This way, if it intends to, it can find liquidity through the sale of part of 
its shares, making the process quicker and more adaptable to the company’s 
needs. Additionally, the desegregation of different segments of a company (in 
this case hotel and casino management vs real estate ownership) allows for each 
segment’s value to be unlocked, by presenting the market with two companies 
with different cores to invest in. An investor that is bullish on Las Vegas real 
estate, but wants not to invest in casinos, can now long the REIT. Considering 
the triple-net-lease structure, the cash-flow is fairly predictable, making it 
resemble a bond, even.  
Shareholder structure 
Roughly 85% of MGM’s outstanding shares are currently held by institutional 
investors. This is the highest % of ownership held by institutional investors in any 
major firm in the Gaming and Casinos industry. At the end of 2019, the three 
largest shareholders were asset manager groups - T. Rowe Price Associates 
(10.6% of total outstanding shares), Vanguard Group (9.7%) and Capital 
Research & Management Co (6.3%).  
The presence of this type of investors may positively be contributing to MGM’s 
low stock volatility. On one hand, (1.) the efficient monitoring conducted by 
institutional investors results in less information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders and (2.) institutions such as mutual or pension funds will both 
seek low volatility assets and engage trading in a more long-term perspective, 
reducing short-term speculation. On the other hand, the positive feedback 
The UPREIT allows the 
company to hold a more liquid 
asset… 
…and unlock each segment’s 
value for investors. 













caused by the large trading volumes may lead to market overreaction and impact 
volatility, but to a lesser degree. 
Corporate Governance 
Every year, Corporate Governance metrics on the sector are analysed in-depth. 
Aethos Consulting Group, for example, conducts a study including 27 companies 
in the gaming industry, analysing 5 key areas: size & independence of the Board; 
committee structure & effectiveness; transactions with related parties; evaluation 
& communication; and finally, and not less important, pay Board compensation 
for performance. From a Corporate Governance perspective, MGM has been 
considerably consistent since has been leading the sector for the third year in a 
row (2015-2018) in board diversity, performance evaluations, committee activism, 
communication to shareholders and pay-for-performance. Regarding Board 
compensation, MGM Chief Executive Officer, James Murren received $12.85m in 
total compensation, barely half of the amount made by Sheldon Adelson, Las 
Vegas Sands Corp CEO (biggest casino player in terms of market capitalization), 
$24.01m.  
Technical Performance 
Looking within a 52-week timespan, MGM’s stock has been recently traded on 
average at $28.07. The highest and lowest value traded were $33.30 and $23.87, 
respectively, which means average stock price was c.-15% off the highest value 
traded and c.19% above lowest one.  
Furthermore, MGM has overperformed the benchmark selected - S&P 500 – given 
the rise of 34.5% in the last 52-week trading span (+16.14% tracking last 6 
months and +20.2% over last 3 months). It has been relatively stable volatility-
wise, displaying a 30-day volatility of just 1.05%. 
MGM’s Positioning – Financial Analysis 
Top Line Analysis 
▪ Bad Fortune of 2015 
The first focal point of the analysis is on the company’s performance in 2015, as it 
is the obvious exception to the steady revenue growth pattern in recent years. The 
sharp fall of 8.8% in revenues consisted in the roughly $1B decrease in turnover in 
MGM Macau (c.-33%). The landmark of MGM’s presence overseas had its 
reputation challenged with the anticorruption campaign introduced in the end of 
2014, with the introduction of smoking restrictions and the reduction in the 
duration of allowed stay in mainland China for travellers. The campaign executed 
Figure 7: 2018 Board Compensation ($M) 
and as % of Total Revenue 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 8 and 9: Revenues, Adj. EBITDA, Adj. 
EBITDA % 2014-2016 ($M) 
















by Chinese authorities consisted in an increased effort in corruption investigations, 
with a strong focus on casino activity. The VIP segment was naturally the most 
affected, although not quantifiable with the company’s filings. The unfortunate time 
for the games of fortune sector exposed the sector’s fragility; with some of its 
stars, such as Wynn Macau and SJM Holdings, falling as much as c.-35% and   
c.-39% in 2015, resulting in a decline in the total Macanese gaming revenue of   
c.-34% (source: DSEC). 
▪ Recovery after the fall 
After the forgettable performance of 2015, MGM’s revenues have grown steadily 
at 8.6% per year; carried by the growth in domestic operations (10.1% CAGR 
2015-2018) that compare to a lukewarm growth of 3.4% in the Chinese segment 
in the same period. 
The North American operations outgrew the US gambling and lodging industries 
(both expressing close to c.5% CAGR 2015-2018). The operations in Macau have 
lagged behind with a c.3% CAGR in the analysed period, with 2016 still being a 
year on the negative (decrease of 18% vs 2015), but with a complete inversion in 
2018, registering a revenue growth of c.32% over the previous year. This trend 
was in line with the industry evolution overall, except for 2018, when the launch of 










Although the company has outgrown the market, it has lagged behind some of the 
most direct competition - three competitors have been the focal point of a 
comparative analysis of the performance of the company – namely Wynn Resorts, 
Caesars Entertainment Corp and Las Vegas Sands Corp - for having a very 
similar business model, with properties in domestic grounds (with a focus in Las 
Vegas) as well as overseas (including Macau). It lagged behind Wynn and 
Caesars that have respectively grown c.27% and c.34% CAGR 2015-2018, 
consequence of the strong investment in new properties and ventures. It has 
outgrown the industry giant Las Vegas Sands, with a CAGR of c.5%, that is yet to 
fully recover from the fall in 2015.  
 
Figure 11: Revenues 2014-2018 for MGM, Las Vegas Sands (LVS), Wynn and Caesars ($M) 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 10: Revenues by Operation 17, 18 and 
LTM ($M) 














▪ Acceleration in 2019, as recent projects ramp-up 
2019 has been a year of acceleration for the company, with a YoY growth of 
accumulated YTD figures of 10.6%. The double-digit growth was mainly focused 
in the Macanese operations (c.24% YoY), with a less intense evolution in the 
domestic sector of 7.3%. 
The notable growth of the Regional segment of c.23% YoY - mostly explained by 
the performance of newly acquired Empire City and Northfield Park casinos as 
well as the opening of MGM Springfield, boosting casino revenue growth to c.28% 
and non-casino to c.13% - was not enough to offset the poor performance of the 
Las Vegas properties, with a mere 1.4% growth YoY. Behind these unsavoury 
2019 results is a fall of over c.9% YoY in the Las Vegas casino turnover. The main 
culprit is the baccarat table game (the main attraction for Asian players), with an 
estimated c.15% decrease YoY. This decline was compensated in part by the 
non-casino segment growing c.5% YoY.  
The Sin City had unsatisfactory results all around, with its Gambling/Lodging 
revenue growing a mere 1.6% YoY (source: Las Vegas Convention and Visitors 
Authority). The reason for the deceleration is not clear, but it correlates to an 
overall decrease in expenditure per tourist. A stronger competition in other North 
American or foreign destinations and a growing demand for online gambling are 
commonly used by the companies in the sector to explain these results. 
Nonetheless, the Las Vegas gambling industry results in 2019 were far below 
expectations and the trend is not expected to extend to 2020.  
The company proudly displays the recent growth in the Macau segment as one of 
the main levers for growth in the upcoming periods, with a 24% growth YoY. The 
ramp up of newly opened MGM Cotai - with 2.3x as many rooms and 1.5x as 
many slot machines as the already considerably large MGM Macau - has had an 
undeniable impact on the company, contributing to an increase of c.31% in 
revenues, which sustained the growth in the far east segment in 2019. What the 
company does not shed too much light on is on how MGM Macau, on the other 
hand, has fallen almost 10% YoY. The shortfall is not specific to MGM Macau, but 
to the gambling industry as a whole, with a 2.4% decline in revenue YoY (source: 
DSEC), associated to the slowdown in the Chinese economy, as well as the 
disruption caused by the recent Hong Kong anti-government protests. This decline 
was mostly felt in the VIP Baccarat table game, falling 17.4% YoY, accounting for 
c.47% of the total 2019 gross gambling in Macau, vs. a crushing c.55% in 2018. 
The decline in VIP table games was slightly compensated by the mass-market 
play, that grew c.15% YoY. Other majors in Macau have also suffered a decline, 
The double-digit growth was 
focused in the Regional and 
Macanese operations… 
… with unsavoury industry-
wide results in Las Vegas. 
Figure 12: Revenues by Operation YTD18 
and YTD19 ($M) 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 13: Revenues by MGM China Hotel 
YTD18 and YTD19 ($M) 












namely Galaxy Entertainment at c.-6% and SJM Holdings at c.-2%. Melco and 
MGM China stand out in 2019, with the new resorts compensating for the L4L 
shortfall. In the case of Melco, with the opening of the Morpheus Resort, revenues 
are up c.13% YoY, still significantly behind MGM’s growth.    
Profitability 
The company generated an EBITDAR of $2.7B (c.23% margin) in 2018, ranking it  
above Wynn (c.20%) and Caesars (c.21%) and significantly below Sands (c.36%). 
Its margin depends mostly on (i.) the state of development of the resorts/casinos, 
(ii.) the actual turnover generated in a period, through economies of scale and (iii.) 
the overall cost management of the different establishments. Therefore, Las 
Vegas Sands seems to benefit from more intense economies of scale, whereas 
MGM and Wynn, not only having a smaller scale, have new projects on ramp-up 
(in the case of MGM and Wynn). Caesars appears to lag behind in overall cost 
efficiency. 
The Regional segment has reported a decline in margin in 2018, combining the 
recent launch of MGM Springfield with a decrease in total turnover. The Regional 
segment was, in fact, affected by the launch of a new establishment (MGM 
Springfield) in 2018, with a decline in the adj. EBITDA margin to 25.9% (vs. 27.0% 
2017). The ramp-up of the hotel has brought the LTM figures up to 26.8%. 
In the Las Vegas resorts, on the other hand, it was the decrease in the turnover 
that caused a decline in the adj. EBITDA margin to 29.8% (vs. 31.0% 2017). The 
decrease in the casino segment of 9.3%, the most profitable business line (with a 
direct margin of c.47% vs. non-casino c.41%) was behind the profitability decline. 
This is definitely more worrying, considering it may be a structural problem, rather 
than a temporary condition of development, like the case of the Regional and 
Chinese segments. 
Considering this risk of a potential structural problem materializing in the following 
years in terms of profitability, the MGM2020 program is somewhat soothing for 
investors. The development program (now in a cost reduction phase), if executed 
as management predicts, is estimated to have an impact of $75M on the 2020 
domestic EBITDA (c.74 bps on margin). The MGM2020 program is further 
developed in the Strategy section. 
The launch of MGM Cotai has affected the Chinese segment’s adj. EBITDA 
margin in 2018 (c.23% vs c.29% in 2017). The LTM figures demonstrate a clear 
improvement, as the resort is picking up on volume, with an LTM EBITDA margin 
of c.25%.  
 
 
Figure 14, 15, and 16: Revenues, Adj. 
EBITDA, Adj. EBITDA % 2017, 2018 and LTM 
($M) 



















ROIC and Investment 
MGM reported a ROIC of 4.8% in 2018, in line with the majority of the direct 
competitors (Figure 17). It is significantly below Las Vegas Sands (12.4%), caused 
by the lower EBITDA margin %, lower depreciation (relative to revenues) and a 
higher revenue to invested capital multiple. Wynn’s 12.5% ROIC should not be 
taken at face value, considering the company reported a significant tax benefit in 
2018, without which its ROIC would total c.5%. ROIC has slowly fallen since 2016, 
given the new investments propelling invested capital, and still not generating 
NOPLAT accordingly. The ROIC is expected to increase with time, as the new 
hotels ramp-up, and economies of scale allow for better margins. This tendency is 
expected to be seen in the industry overall, as it consolidates. 
The company has undergone massive investments in the past few years, with the 
launch and acquisition of different resorts. A total of $2B of capital expenditures in 
2018 place the company’s Capex/revenue ratio at c.13% (Figure 18). Industry 
averages c.8% of revenue, which is a more reasonable maintenance level for the 
company going forward. As expected, Wynn and MGM stand out with the 
investment undergone.  
Capital Structure  
The company currently has $13.6B of net debt, representing 5.1x EBITDA or 0.8x 
D/E. It has increased leverage in the recent years, with the investment round 
undergone. These levels of indebtness are not unusual among the peers, but the 
company claims it intends to decrease the net debt to c.3-4x EBITDA in the 
medium term. It currently pays c.5% interest on debt but has recently incurred in 
new credit facilities in the US of LIBOR + 2.00% and in Macao of HIBOR + 1.63%. 
Business Model 
MGM’s business model relies on 4 main activities:  
▪ Gambling;  
▪ Rooms (and other related hotel services); 
▪ Food & Beverage (F&B); 
▪ Entertainment, Retail and Other (ER&O). 
Even though the 4 activities are transversal, the relevance of each activity varies 
from geography to geography. From the three operations, Las Vegas shows the 
most diversified revenue source – LTM mix consisting in c.32% from Rooms, 
Figure 17: 2018 ROIC % - MGM, Wynn, LVS, 
Penn, Boyd and Caesars 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 18: Capex ($M) and Capex/Revenues 
2014-2018 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 19: Capital Structure – Net Debt 
($B) and Net Debt/EBITDA 2014-2018  























c.26% from F&B, c.23% from Casino and c.19% from Entertainment – whilst 
Regional and Macau display a strong dependence of gambling activities, with 
c.71% and c.90% respectively. Diversification of sources of revenues in LV 
allows MGM to pull diverse operational levers at different points in the economic 
cycle, offering a more integrated experience to its customers in the Gambling 
Capital of the world. 
However, in the past two decades, despite still being the dominant segment, there 
has been a decrease on the weight of the casino business line in the revenue mix, 
as the company evolved into a more integrated service. This was mainly seen in 
Las Vegas, where the casino segment represented the majority of revenue in the 
beginning of the century, shifting to a much more even mix in current times. 
Gambling drivers 
MGM reports the gaming drivers differently for each country’s operations. This 
happens due to the different culture of the clients in each segment, ultimately 
leading to different needs and desires of its gamblers.  
In the U.S, the gaming activity is seen as a recreational activity, where the 
client’s profile is not just a gambler but someone that seeks for an integrated 
experience (as depicted on the sources of revenue in the U.S and specially in 
LV). In contrast, the Macanese gambler (classified as a mass or VIP player) has 
one intention when visiting a casino: gambling. Nevertheless, upon the launch of 
MGM Cotai in 2018, the company aimed to provide a more complete experience 
to its customers, accommodating also for the demand of non-gaming amenities – 
as suites, VIP luxury villas and thematic hotspots were built. 
▪ Domestic drivers 
For both U.S operations, Las Vegas and Regional, the gaming activity relies on 4 
main drivers: 
▪ Table Games Drop: Total amount gambled at blackjack, baccarat, 
roulette and other related table games; 
▪ Table Games Win %: Percentage of the table games that is won by MGM 
and which flows to the Casino revenue; 
▪ Slots Handle: Total amount gambled at slots machines; 
▪ Slots Hold %: Percentage of the slot handle that is won by MGM and 
which flows to the Casino revenue. 
Las Vegas: The segment displayed a significant YoY decrease in casino revenue 
of 9.3%, largely explained by table games volatility: table games drop fell 6.6% 
YoY but also table games win % fell 2.7 p.p. Contrarily, slots revenue shields 
Figure 21: Domestic Gambling Drivers 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Figure 20: Revenue mix by operation LTM 












MGM from that volatility: slots handle and slots hold % increased respectively 
5.1% and 2.5 p.p. The slots have proven to be a more stable revenue source.   
Additionally, LV performance becomes even less optimistic when we look to 
MGM’s gaming revenue growth in comparison against the benchmark (Las Vegas 
Strip). According to LVCVA Research Center (Las Vegas Convention and Visitors 
Authority), LV Strip displayed a (low but) positive growth of gaming revenues of 
0.9% YoY. 
The LV operation’s turnover volatility benefits from a higher share of the slots’ 
revenue in the mix, compared to rivals’ operations that rely more on table games 
(baccarat and other Asian-sourced table games). In 2018, MGM’s slots machines 
contributed for c.55% of LV gaming revenue (and c.59% LTM). In the case of 
Wynn Resorts, for example, slot machines accounted for a mere c.32% in 2018.   
Regional: The gaming revenue in the Regional segment has increased c.28% 
YoY, mainly due to the acquisition of Empire City, Northfield Park and a MGM 
Springfield’s full quarter of operations, resulting in an increase in the slots hold of 
17.4% (which was already the most significant source) and table games drop of 
7.2%. Additionally, there was also an increase of slots hold % and table games 
win % (contrarily to LV) of 0.3 p.p and 0.4 p.p respectively. 
The reported revenues for both segments are net of incentives – marketing 
strategy of the company to attract more gamblers.  
▪ Macau drivers 
As previously stated, in the Macanese market, MGM (and other gaming 
operators) segment the table games’ revenue between VIP players and Mass 
players. Henceforth, MGM China relies on 6 gaming drivers: 
▪ VIP Table Games Turnover: Total amount gambled at the VIP table 
games; 
▪ VIP Table Games Win %: Percentage of the VIP table games that is 
won by MGM and which flows to the Casino revenue. 
▪ Main Floor Table Games Drop: Total amount gambled at the main 
floor table games; 
▪ Main Floor Table Games Win %: Percentage of the mass table games 
that is won by MGM and which flows to the Casino revenue. 
▪ Slots Handle: Total amount gambled at slots machines; 
▪ Slots Hold %: Percentage of the slot handle that is won by MGM and 
which flows to the Casino revenue. 
Figure 24: MGM China Gambling Drivers 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Figure 22: Breakdown of YoY evolution of 
YTD Casino revenue – Las Vegas ($M) 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 23: Breakdown of YoY evolution of 
YTD Casino revenue – Regional ($M) 












MGM China: The gaming revenue result was strongly driven by the MGM Cotai 
launch on Feb’2018, reporting a c.24% growth YoY. When comparing 2017 vs 
2018, VIP table games revenue increased c.13%, due primarily to an increase in 
turnover of c.18%, which includes the ramp-up of MGM Cotai, partially offset by a 
fall in VIP table games win % at MGM Macau. 
Following the tendency of the previous years, mass table games continues to be 
the most profitable segment for MGM China (as well for the Macau gambling 
market), since unlike VIP segment, mass players do not receive commissions 
and thus lead to a higher profit margin. All in all, in 2018 mass table games win 
increased c.33% YoY, with MGM Cotai contributed with an YoY increase in the 
drop of c.48%. Following this reasoning, MGM China has already started to 
reallocate tables from VIP to the main floor in order to maximize the yield.  
Furthermore, the ramp-up of MGM Cotai allowed slot machine revenue to 
increase c.58% YoY in 2018. 
Room drivers 
In contrast to the gaming activity, Room drivers are transversal to the three types 
of MGM’s operation. In simple terms, the economics of rooms consists on the 
following drivers: 
▪ Occupancy rate; 
▪ Average daily rate (ADR): Division between the average revenue 
earned from rooms and the number of rooms booked. 
▪ RevPar: The product of the ADR and the occupancy rate. 
The number of rooms is approximately fixed, unless the company acquires other 
establishments or decides to expand one of its own. Therefore, the RevPar 
stands as the Rooms segment’s main driver (and a decent proxy of the 
performance of the industry). As it is a daily indicator, it is applied on the total 
yearly working days, fixed ad 365. 
Las Vegas: For all main US gateway and convention locations, Las Vegas has 
the largest number of total hotel rooms, which is supported by strong 
infrastructure. For 2016-20181, the rooms revenue growth has been relatively 
slow, displaying a CAGR of 0.7%. The 2019 YTD figures have grown 4.8% YoY, 
aligned with the benchmark (LV Strip) that has also displayed an increase of 
4.8% YoY. 
Going into detail for 2016-2018 period, RevPar slightly increased from $137.9 to 
$139.3 (c.1%), product of an increase in ADR from $148.3 to $153.3 and a fall in 
the Occupancy Rate of 2 p.p. (93.0% to c.91.0%).  
Figure 26: Room Drivers 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
Figure 25: Breakdown of YoY evolution of 
YTD Casino revenue – MGM China ($M) 
Source: Company Filings, ER Analysis 
 
1The 2016-2018 period is analysed for this segment, as no information was made available for 
the YTD evolution of the drivers. 
 
Figure 27: RevPar ($), ADR ($) and 
Occupancy Rate (%) 2016-2018 – Las Vegas 












Regional: The Regional operations have grown significantly in 2017, with the full 
year contribution of Borgata and MGM National Harbour. In 2018, the segment 
reported a RevPar of $132.0, combining an ADR of $145.0 with an occupancy 
rate of 91.1%. Despite the launch of MGM Springfield, the decrease in RevPar of 
4.1% kept the segment’s revenue at roughly the same level.  
MGM China: Contrarily to the American based operation, the room revenue is 
still a trivial share of revenue in Macau (c.5% in 2018).  
Nevertheless, the segment has recently registered significant grown, more than 
doubling in 2016-2018. The reason for the segment’s expansion was the launch 
of MGM Cotai (February 2018), as the number of rooms increased by from 580 
to almost 2,000. With an ADR of $172.5 and high occupancy rates of almost 
97%, the Macanese operations reported a RevPar of $166.8.  
F&B and ER&O drivers 
Similar to the Rooms activity, these activities drivers are transversal to the three 
types of MGM’s operation. Their performance is strongly correlated to the 
performance of the other activities, Gambling and Rooms, as they can be 
considered as valuable add-ons. Essentially, food and beverage, and retail 
arrangements are the net amount gathered from the client for such goods and 
services. The transaction price for those contracts is recorded as revenue when 
the good/service is transferred to the client over their stay at the hotel or when 
the transfer is made for the F&B and retail & other contracts.  
Trends (opportunities and risks) 
Macroeconomic and Sector Outlook 
The entire business model of the company revolves around the ability to draw 
customers to its resorts and find the most efficient and recurring ways to profit 
from their visit. All segments are linked and depend on the actual flow of people 
to the facilities, as well as their willingness to expend on non-essential products 
and services. Naturally, MGM and its peers are highly exposed to economic 
cycles and, subsequently, to (i.) the travel and tourism and (ii.) gambling trends in 
the market.  
▪ United States 
As we currently sit late on the economic cycle, fears of an economic downturn 
loom investors’ minds. After record-long expansion, the economy appears to be 
slowing down (LTM c.2% real GDP growth rate – the slowest 12m decrease in 
the past three years). However, the labour market remains strong (3.6% 
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unemployment rate, a 50-year low), wage has steadily grown (latest figures point 
to c.3% YoY increase of on average hourly earnings – source: US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics) and inflation is below c.2%, keeping momentum on consumer 
spending, which accounts for roughly two thirds of the American economy. The 
Consumer Confidence Index remains high (at 125.9x), although starting to show 
signs of falling expectations by consumers, with growing concerns on business 
conditions and job prospects (source: Conference Board). Consumer Sentiment 
(by University of Michigan Survey of Consumers) remains relatively stable at 
95.7x (comparing to a 2019 average of 95.6x). Rising geopolitical tensions have 
increased uncertainty about future global trading, affecting business confidence 
and investment, although Beijing and Washington have reached common 
grounds with a preliminary deal (Phase-1 deal). Nonetheless, the tension is still 
present and affects consumers’ confidence (source: University of Michigan 
Survey of Consumers). There have been red flags all around, with record high 
transaction multiples and S&P quotes, a case of yield curve inversion, a surge in 
gold prices, record funds’ dry powder and a low interest/easy credit environment 
– with clear resemblances to pre-recession times. 
The US hotel market has strived with the post-recession recovery, with a total US 
Hotel revenue growing 5.5% CAGR since 2010 (STR Global), beating the US 
GDP growth (4.1% CAGR). It has benefited from the positive economic cycle and 
the increased accessibility of travel. RevPAR has grown steadily for the past 8 
years (5.4% CAGR), after the decline in ’09, with recent signs of deceleration 
(source: Cushman & Wakefield). Expectations on the industry are not 
consensual, depending on the expectation for the timing of a macroeconomy 
downturn, but the number of visitors to the US and the total travel spending are 
expected to growth at 2.7% and 4.0% respectively, until 2023 (source: US 
Department of Commerce). The gambling sector has grown at sub-economy 
levels, with a 3.3% CAGR since 2010. Despite the cyclicality of the sector and its 
correlation with tourism, it failed to grow at the same pace. Part of the reason is 
demographics, as younger audiences are less reluctant to traditional casino 
gambling. The recognition of the importance of changing the appeal of the 
gaming experience is a common theme in MGM and its peers’ announcements, 
as a large part of revenue could be jeopardized. 
Nonetheless, with the sector’s KPIs at record levels, the question about the 
sector having reached its inflection point looms investors’ minds. Its correlation 
with discretionary spending is undeniable and, when the cycle inverts, MGM (and 
its peers) will take a hit to the hotel profitability, subsequently affecting all other 
business segments.  
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The economy of Macau largely depends on tourism sector and gambling industry 
– travel and tourism accounted for over 70% of the 2018 Macanese GDP. After 
suffering in the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the local economy has become 
healthier growing along with the tourism and gambling industries. Following the 
years of contraction, especially due to Chinese influence over foreign exchange 
and visa policies (the Anti-Corruption Campaign and visa restrictions) and the 
slowdown of Chinese economy, the economy of Macau is growing again, reaching 
6.3% real GDP growth rate in 2018. Furthermore, the IMF forecasts the economy 
to continue to growth in 2019 and 2020, 6.3% and 5.8%, respectively. 
After overcoming the recession, the fiscal surplus increased – leading the fiscal 
stimulus to reduce – and is expected follow the same path in the short-medium 
term. Macau benefits from policies that aim at financial stability and fiscal 
discipline, with the Region showing no public debt and a rising current account 
surplus – accounting 35.9% of GDP in 2018. Despite showing optimistic results in 
different activities (such as banking and communications), the economy continues 
to be highly dependent on the gambling industry as it represents c.70% of 
Macau’s tax income. Henceforth, the gaming operators are huge contributors for 
the low unemployment rate – c.2.0% in 2018 (with IMF expecting it to decrease 
even more in 2019 and 2020) – as they employ 1/5 of the active workforce. 
The opening in late 2018 of the HKZM (Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau) Bridge 
provided more robust economic dynamics within Hong Kong, leading to a not so 
symbolical increase in visitors: comparing the 1st half of 2018 vs 2019, visitors by 
land rose by 25.6% (2.5m people), leading the Macau tourism industry to be better 
than ever.  
Apart from 2015 and 2016 values (marked by the Anti-Corruption Campaign), 
since 2010, Macau is progressively rising the number of tourists, reaching 35.8 
million in 2018, resulting on a CAGR of 4.6%. However, the increase in visitors is 
viewed with caution by the Macau administration as the increase does not appear 
to be 100% manageable - leading to talks of a controversial (and still hypothetical) 
tourist tax. 
As mentioned previously, the Anti-Corruption Campaign led by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping and his remaining team shocked Macau’s gambling revenue in 2015 
and 2016 and bouncing back afterwards, displaying a CAGR of 7.3% when we 
compare 2015 vs. 2018 values. Nonetheless, it’s not all perfect, considering the 
region suffered a loss of upper/elite visitors since the Anti-Corruption Campaign 
took place (Macau’s tax haven status faded away) and now due to U.S-China 
trade tensions. All in all, the number of visitors may not compensate for the loss of 
VIP revenue. 
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Accounting 41 casinos in operation, Macau generated a yearly gross revenue of 
$37.6B in 2018 from the gambling industry (source: DSEC). Concerning 2019 
data, the city of Macau has registered in November 28 consecutive months of 
gambling revenue growth. According to the GICB (Gaming Inspection and 
Coordination Bureau), the Gross Gaming Revenue has increased 2.6% YoY when 
comparing with the homologous period of 2018. Nevertheless, the revenue has 
slowed down to a single-digit growth for the second time. The single-digit growth is 
a clear sign of the combination of a Chinese economy slowing down and trade war 
tensions between Beijing and Washington affecting too.  
 
Digitization and disruption 
The process of digitization in its disruptive nature may shift the tables, creating 
room for growth of the most versatile players and putting those that cannot keep 
up with the evolution at risk. Adding to the cyclical risk of the industry, is the 
underlying shift in the sector’s foundation, with digitization and the entrance of 
new platforms in the lodging equation as well as new gambling preferences by 
consumers. 
▪ Airbnb 
Airbnb and other platforms of the same nature have been adopted by users on a 
global scale, considerably boosting the market supply for rooms – estimated over 
5 million listings worldwide. Despite offering a different value proposition than 
most hotels, the impact on the industry is obvious, as consumers are presented 
with a large variety of options at very competitive prices, through a user-friendly 
platform that allows for instant comparison. The impact of the increased supply is 
logical, but, considering Airbnb listings account to less than 2% of the total Las 
Vegas supply, it is limited for now. Adding to the supply effect, Airbnb and the 
digital movement have forced hotel chains to invest in their online platforms, 
which, arguably, forced hotels to increase maintenance and refurbishment 
efforts, in the sense that consumers can much easily compare conditions of 
different resorts online. Overall, consumers had much to gain from the presence 
of Airbnb and hotels cannot disregard the shift in consumer behaviour, especially 
when the most affected demographics consist on the relatively more tech savvy 
generations, progressively worsening the situation with time.  
▪ Online Gambling and Sports Betting  
Online gambling is currently an over $50B market (source: Bloomberg) with 
momentum sustaining expectations to beat $100B by 2025. It allows gamblers to 
play from their own homes, with an increasingly realistic experience, enabled by 
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real table dealers and the evolution of virtual reality. These platforms allow for a 
more recurring gambling activity (as players do not have to physically move to 
the facilities), easier consumer conversion (for the same reason) and eliminates 
the physical space constraint that casinos could traditionally face. Additionally, 
the product offering in online gambling is, in its nature, more versatile than 
traditional casinos, regarding the adaptability of the pool of games offered to 
gamblers. It’s logically easier to implement a new game in an online platform 
than in a physical casino, a factor that gains relevance considering the fact that 
the sector is far from mature and consumer preferences may not be stable or, at 
least, fully recognized by companies.  
In May 2018, the US Supreme Court lifted the ban on online sports betting. Since 
then, a total of 10 states have legalized the activity and 24 others are pending 
legislation, comparing to a pre-2018 regulatory landscape where Nevada was the 
only pro-sports betting state. The illegal sports betting market was estimated to 
total $150B betting handle, comparing to a current $10B handle in legal online 
sports betting platforms, demonstrating the room for further growth of the current 
players in the market.  
The versatility of online gambling platforms previously mentioned, allows 
companies to combine the offer of the typical games of luck the users desire, as 
well these other kinds of betting, such as sports betting, all in one platform for 
fully integrated product. The evolution of the industry, combined with the 
transition of the consumer mix to generations more captivated by online 
activities, justify the companies’ interest in the segment. 
New Entrants 
The casino and lodging industries are highly competitive, considering the low 
switching costs for consumers and the easy comparability of the experiences. 
The launch of new hotels and casinos is a major threat to existing casino resorts, 
as the visitor attention and demand is naturally limited.  
▪ Las Vegas 
Two major casino-resorts stand out in the Las Vegas landscape - Resorts World 
Las Vegas and The Drew – with respective planned openings for 2021 and 2022. 
The former, a $4B, 59-story megaresort, will add 3 400 rooms to the Strip supply. 
It is part of the Genting Group’s expansion program and the project will be 
monitored by former MGM Grand president Scott Sibella. The latter will 
incorporate Marriot’s next-gen brand Edition, with over 3 700 new rooms 
announced in the Strip. The last casino of this magnitude to be launched in Las 
Vegas was Marriot’s The Cosmopolitan Las Vegas, launched back in 2010. 
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Other, less significant resorts, are also planned to launch in Las Vegas, namely 
Circa Resort & Casino in 2020 (with close to 800 rooms downtown and a strong 
focus on sports betting) and Majestic Las Vegas (a promising non-gaming hotel, 
with close to 700 rooms that will be focused on conventions and events). These 
examples demonstrate the liveliness of the industry in Las Vegas, with new and 
exciting projects announced in a segment that could already seem saturated. 
▪ Regional 
Less intense increase in competition is expected for the other domestic 
operations, considering the lack of relevant projects planned in the cities where 
MGM operates.  
▪ Macau 
SJM Holdings Limited is the largest player in the industry in Macau. It operates 
roughly 20 casinos in Macau, including the iconic Casino Grand Lisboa. In late 
2020, it will launch Grand Lisboa Palace, a 2 000-room luxury hotel and casino in 
the Cotai Strip, resulting in an investment rounding $5B.   
Other 
▪ Japan 
The Japanese market is one of the hottest topics in the gambling industry. After 
the Integrated Resorts Promotion Act was completed in 2018, the Japanese 
market will be managed by private operators as well and casino activities will 
become legal. With tourism as the cornerstone of Japanese economic growth - in 
2018 surpassed for the first time by the target of 30M incoming tourists, spending 
more than $ 41.5B in goods and services - the Japanese government intends to 
continue promoting a strategy of sustained tourism growth. In other words, Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe and his government estimate that in the future tourism will 
involve promoting integrated resorts (such as MGM Cotai or Marine Bay Sands in 
Singapore). Although still difficult to estimate, the gambling pattern in Japan 
seems to make this growth opportunity very attractive to MGM. Nevertheless, the 
upcoming times will be crucial to the unfolding of the history. Further analysis can 
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Lighter Structure - MGM2020 
The company is in the middle of the MGM2020 growth program – a plan designed 
to further reduce costs, improve efficiencies and position MGM for growth. Its 
predecessor, the Profit Growth Plan, was successfully met by the end of 2017, 
resulting in a margin increase through a larger scale. The main goal of MGM2020 
passes by achieving an annualized adjusted EBITDA increase of $300 million, 
consisting on two phases: $200 million by the end of 2020 and an additional $100 
million by the end of 2021. The program consists on a centralization of company-
wide functions, staff reduction and digital integration in the experience, in an 
attempt to improve efficiency, as well as the ramp-up of newly launched 
properties. So far, the company has proven the ability to follow through, and the 
2019 targets are expected to be met. Most of the investment is expected to have 
already been done for this phase, totalling c.$40M to date. The company has laid 
off almost one thousand employees so far (mostly in Las Vegas) and has 
announced it intends no further job cutting, following the natural backlash. Despite 
the results demonstrated so far, we are reticent of a full target meeting for 2020, 
considering constraint for further staff reduction.  
Asset-light 
MGM has changed its view on asset ownership. Prior to the launch of its UPREIT 
and the master-lease program, it owned all the properties in which it operated. 
Now, not only has it transferred the ownership of many of its assets to MGP, but it 
has recently also incurred in the sale-leaseback and sale of some of its properties 
with other unrelated parties. Through a sale-leaseback deal, the company finds a 
liquidity injection, in return for a long-term lease plan. The conversion of an 
otherwise illiquid asset into cash allows the company to (i.) improve its leverage 
ratios, (ii.) incur in new investment opportunities or (iii.) benefit from an 
appreciation of the value of the asset. In practical terms, the structure is similar to 
that of a loan with the asset under question as collateral, with the benefit that the 
lender, unlike financial players, values the property at market value and imposes 
less-constraining covenants. The downside, like that of a loan, is the recurring 
payment obligation in which the company incurs, increasing the risk in case of 
underperformance.  
Considering highly leveraged financial structure of the company, the sale-
leaseback of real estate may relieve investors concerned about the ability of the 
company to endure turmoil, especially considering the uncertainty in the short to 
medium-term prospects for the industry. Another event, of non-recurring nature, 
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that affected the company’s liquidity, was the litigation regarding the Las Vegas 
massacre of 2017 – with 58 mortal victims of a mass shooting in MGM Mandalay 
Bay property – that ended this year, settling a compensation $800M to the victims 
and their families. 
In mid-October 2019, MGM issued a statement revealing the sale of two real-
estate assets from its portfolio, Bellagio and Circus-Circus, both located on the 
Las Vegas Strip. The sale of Bellagio brought up to life a joint venture with 
Blackstone Real Estate Income Trust (BREIT), resulting in a cash infusion of 
$4.25 billion. Under the contract, MGM holds a 5% stake through the partnership 
and will pay an annual rent of $245 million, which amounts around for half of the 
resort 2018 EBITDA. Similarly to the MGP master lease, MGM will continue to 
manage and be responsible for the operational expenses, insurance and property 
taxes. The transaction has an implied price multiple of 17.3x annual rent, 
considerably higher than the combined price-to-rent multiple of 12.4x associated 
with the transfer of ownership of the resorts Borgata, Empire City, National 
Harbour and Northfield Park to MGP. Concerning Circus-Circus deal, MGM is 
selling directly to Phil Ruffin. Ruffin will pay $662.5 million in cash up front, plus a 
$162.5 million note due in 2024 for the property (which generated $62 million in 
adjusted EBITDA over the past 12 months). The sale of Circus Circus is far less 
surprising compared to the Bellagio one, especially given the price that Mr. Ruffin 
was willing to pay and since the resort can be integrated in a downmarket 
segment relative to the company's higher-end resorts, although proceeds from 
the transaction will be used towards enhancing the company’s capital allocation 
strategy and complement its strategic and operational flexibility. 
▪ Eyes on Osaka: Genting rivalry 
The cash raised from the transactions mentioned above will give MGM the ability 
to cut a significant share of debt, distribute dividends to shareholders and invest in 
new opportunities, such as the new resort project in Osaka, Japan, soon-to-be-
opened gambling market, or some combination of the three. Entering in the 
Japanese market is considered to be one of the company's best growth 
opportunities, and given that, establishing a casino resort there could cost $10 
billion (or more1). 
 
MGM and Genting are likely to go toe-to-toe for a casino license in Osaka, based 
on their main strengths in building casino resorts in Las Vegas and Singapore. 
 
1 Investment amount that Las Vegas Sands’ Managing Director, George Tanasijevich, referred that is expected to spend if the project in 
Yokohama (similar to the one that MGM projects in Osaka) goes live. 
MGM announced its first sale-
leaseback with a party 
external to the group 
The Bellagio transaction has 
an implied price multiple         
of 17.3x annual rent, 
significantly above the prices 
previously paid by MGP  
The increased liquidity 
allows the company to 
consider new investment 
opportunities, namely the 
integrated resort in Osaka 
 
 








Both companies are used to mix entertainment and attractions – something that 
the soon-to-be winner of the Osaka license has to have. The Osaka integrated 
resort is projected to be closed city attractions such as the Osaka Aquarium and 
the Universal Studios. Yet, it is expected that the number of attractions and 
demand-drivers increase in the area. It is forecasted that mass-market segment 
will account for a significant share of gaming revenue, which augurs a positive 
scenario for the contest winner, in terms of profit gains.  
 
In this corporate race, the company Genting Singapore threatens MGM: Genting 
owns the Universal Studios on Sentosa Island and Marina Bay Sands Integrated 
Resort (both in Singapore), which may give it an edge given a similar setup in 
Osaka. At the same time, MGM accounts with Las Vegas expertise (largest arena, 
hosting large-scale events in Las Vegas that generate demand for their resorts) 
and higher brand recognition.  
▪ Eyes on Sports Betting and Interactive 
The “asset-light” business model is also aligned with MGM's expansion into sports 
betting. Sports betting does not depend nor require an expensive portfolio of 
resorts, requires instead technological infrastructure and the right marketing to get 
exposure. In the light of this, MGM has formed a strategic partnership - so called 
Roar Digital - with GVC Holdings PLC, one of the world's largest sports betting 
and gambling groups and constituent of the FTSE 250 Index, with $6.6 billion 
market cap.  
The collaboration will exploit GVC’s proprietary technology and operating 
expertise to offer market leading and UK experience to build a US sports betting 
business on MGM’s brand and customer data. Through this joint-venture, 
attractive deals were already made with the NBA (National Basketball 
Association), NHL (National Hockey League) and MLB (Major League Baseball) 
leagues to be their official sports betting partner. If these sponsorships succeed, 
MGM will have another business to leverage with little assets invested.  Not less 
important, Roar Digital has launched in the 3Q19, the BetMGM online gambling 
app which gives market access opportunities in 15 states (and still pursuing 
opportunities to gain market access in an additional 9 states).  
In addition to the partnership with GVC, MGM continues to reinforce its sports 
betting strategy by diversifying its opportunity growth options. In October, MGM 
established an online betting partnership with Yahoo Sports to integrate its 
BetMGM application into Yahoo Sports mobile app. Due to this partnership, from 
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November onwards, MGM will have access to the country’s largest fantasy sports 
platform2.  
Not so long before, in September, the Company announced an agreement with 
Buffalo Wild Wings, which holds and runs more than 1200 sports bars across the 
U.S. As part of the arrangement, BetMGM customers who access the app in a 
New Jersey Buffalo Wild Wings can take part in exclusive promotions. Moreover, 
MGM also worked with Taco Bell on a World Series promotion.  
▪ Investor Returns 
Prior to 2017, MGM would not pay dividends to its shareholders. In late 2016, it 
announced the plans payback investors with dividends every quarter; a structure it 
has kept and plans to keep, according to the CEO. It paid $0.11, $0.12 and $0.13 
per quarter in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively. It resulted in a payback ratio of 
back 40% of its earnings in 2018, with a payback ratio of 52% expected for 2019 
(assuming a $0.13 dividend per share in 4Q19). The company announced its 
plans to keep gradually increasing the absolute dividend payment, although, 
considering the EPS expectations, will result in a lower payout ratio for future 
periods. 
It has also recently completed a $2.25B share repurchase, phased throughout 
2017, 2018 and 2019, signalling the management’s strong conviction in the value 
of the company. No intentions of further buybacks have been made public. 
The Debate 
Bull’s Arguments 
Bulls point to strong profitability enhancement potential, as new resorts ramp up 
and the company is under a cost reduction program – with 2027e 28.8% EBITDA 
margin. Solid free cash-flow generation is expected, combining strong revenue 
growth (mainly with ramp-up of the new hotels and casinos), strong margin 
improvement and the end of the capex intensive investment round of 2017-2018; 
allowing for a deleverage of the current financial structure. Strong margins and 
expected FCF generation mitigate the exposure of the company to potential 
macroeconomic deterioration, as the company can more smoothly face 
turbulence. Despite the dividend yield of 1.6%, a sustained dividend growth is 
expected, comparing to industry peers that have paid dividends for longer and 
offer higher yields, but with no prospects of increase. The Travel and Tourism 
 
2 A Statista study indicated that 39 percent of US fantasy sports players in 2017 played at least in one league run by Yahoo! Sports. That 
equals the total for DraftKings and FanDuel combined. 
MGM’s DPS is expected to 
keep steadily increasing  
 
 








industry, both in the US and Macau, show a strong momentum and further growth 
is expected, from which MGM will likely benefit considering the strong competitive 
positioning and brand recognition, especially in Las Vegas and Macau. The 
company seems well positioned regarding the growth of the online gambling 
market - with the GVC partnership – to benefit from the growing demand for online 
products combined with the more lenient regulatory landscape, demonstrating its 
adaptability to industry transformations in a structural long-term perspective. The 
launch of an integrated resort in Osaka also poses as a strong opportunity for 
growth, considering some of the most obvious competition has backed down from 
possibility of entering the Osaka market, therefore creating a softer competitive 
environment at entrance, combined with a political plan focused on the promotion 
the tourism industry. 
Bears’ Arguments 
 Bears point to the recent deceleration of economic growth and potential collapse 
of the current state of economy, considering the observed similarities with pre-
recession conditions. The macroeconomic slowdown has been more visible in the 
Chinese economy, contributing to the YoY decline of the VIP gambling revenue in 
Macau in 2019. Although the decline was compensated, in part, by the non-VIP 
segment, the company is more exposed to the VIP table games than the industry 
average, which has already impacted the profitability of MGM Macau. The ramp-
up of MGM Cotai has helped sweep this slowdown under the rug, as it allows the 
Macanese segment to beat its previous results quarter after quarter. The tourism 
and gambling industries are highly cyclical and, considering the current leverage 
level of the company, a dip in the short-term, despite unlikely, could be critical. 
The Las Vegas industry-wide deceleration in casino revenue may also prove to be 
structural, with the increased popularity of casinos in other geographies. The Q3 
results indicated the company will meet the earnings expectations and MGM2020 
targets for 2019. Despite the good news, we believe the market has overreacted 
to the earnings release, as the stock surged 10.2% that week. On the topic, is our 
expectation that the positive results so far do ensure the company will meet the 
MGM2020 targets for next year, as the cost reduction was mostly seen in the staff 
costs, a lever that will not be used in the same magnitude in 2020, as the 
company has publicly announced it will not repeat staff reduction seen in 2019. 
New entrants are bound to shake up Las Vegas and Macanese gambling 
industries, with major integrated resorts planned for next couple of years in both 
geographies.  
Note: The threat of Airbnb is not yet considered a material argument against the 
company, considering the tier of MGM’s resorts and different value proposition.  
 
 








Methodology and Valuation 
Forecasts 
Considering MGM’s positioning relative to its peers, the current macroeconomic 
outlook, industry trends and opportunities and the company’s strategic outline, we 
have forecasted the main drivers previously discussed, and the resulting financial 
performance expected. We expect revenues to grow at a 3.5% CAGR 2019-2027, 
boosted by the growth of the Macanese segment with the ramp-up of MGM Cotai 
(4.9% CAGR, with an 8.5% in the next two years). We expect EBITDA margins to 
converge to 28.1% by 2027e, considering the scale improvement and the partially 






More specifically, the main drivers are estimated as follows: 
 
Main Drivers 19-21 21-24 24-27 Comments
Table Games Drop -1,0% 1,9% 1,8%
After significant underperformance in 2019, we expect 2020 to still be on the red, with 2021 
finally returning to positive growth, converging to long-term growth of 1.8%.
Slots Handle 2,5% 2,1% 1,8%
Slots handle is expected to grow at higher rates in the short/medium term, considering current 
momentum.
LV ADR 2,2% 1,8% 1,8%
ADR is expected to converge to the expcected inflation levels in the long-term, with stronger 
evolution in the short-term considering current momentum.
Occupancy Rate 0,6% 0,3% 0,0%
Occupancy rate is expected to slightly increase in the short-term, stabilizing at run-rate 
expected levels by 2024.
ER&O 11,0% 4,0% 3,0%
ER&O is expected to increase more intensely in the short-term, in line with the market 
expectations for the convention demand
Table Games Drop 2,7% 2,0% 1,8%
Table games drop is expected to grow at higher rates in the short/medium term, considering 
current momentum.
Slots Handle 5,0% 2,5% 2,0%
Slots handle is expected to grow at higher rates in the short/medium term, considering current 
momentum.
Regional ADR 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% ADRis expected to grow at inflation expectations.
Occupancy Rate 0,4% 0,1% 0,1% Occupancy rate is expected to remain fairly constant at current levels.
ER&O 5,5% 2,5% 1,5%
ER&O is expected to increase more intensely in the short-term, in line with the market 





Figure 31: Revenue Forecasts 2019-2027. 
Breakdown by Operation 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 1: Main Domestic Revenue 
Drivers Assumptions 2019-2027 













Main Drivers 19-21 21-24 24-27 Comments
VIP Table Games Turnover 7,1% 5,0% 2,6%
VIP table games turnover is expected to grow at a strong pace in the short-term, with the ramp-
up of MGM Cotai.
Mass Table Games Drop 9,5% 4,3% 2,6%
Mass table games dropis expected to grow at a strong pace in the short-term, with the ramp-
up of MGM Cotai.
Slots Handle 11,2% 3,2% 2,6%
Slots handle is expected to grow at a higher pace in the short-term, as it is combines growth 
throught the ramp-up of MGM Cotai with postive expectations for MGM Macau.
ADR 2,0% 1,4% 1,0%
ADR is espected to grow below inflation, as MGM Cotai gains relevance (lower ADR than 
MGM Macau).
Occupancy Rate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% Expected to remain constant (currently at 97% already).
ER&O 42,5% 24,9% 8,0%
Very small business line in terms of turnover translates into more bullish looking rates than 




Given the unpredictability of certain drivers and the respective impact on the 
valuation, a sensitivity to different driver assumptions for specific drivers was 
conducted and is presented in the end of the valuation conclusions section. Two 
additional scenarios were also modeled, respectively with an overall more 
optimistic and pessimistic view of the what the future lies for MGM. They are 
referred to as Bull and Bear scenario, comparing to the Base case of the analysis. 
The expected margin of the company reflects both the gains in efficiency from 
economies of scale (therefore resulting in better margins as sales increase) and 
the impact of MGM2020. A sensitivity to the degree to which MGM will achieve the 
MGM2020 targets was conducted – the methodology and results are presented in 
one of the analysts’ individual reports.  
Considerations 
An individual valuation was performed for the domestic and the Macanese 
segments, allowing for a sum of parts valuation of the group. The UPREIT was 
considered with the implied non-controlling interest, estimated through its market 
capitalization: 
Valuation = (US Operations – 0.33% MGP MktCap) + 0.56% China Operations 
A set of comparables was selected for each geography, for the WACC estimation 
and multiples analysis.  
For the DCF valuation of the domestic section, a WACC of 7.25% was considered, 
with a cost of debt and cost of equity of 3.95% and 10.01%, respectively. The cost 
of debt mirrors the cost of the latest financing of the company, at LIBOR + 2.00%. 
The cost of equity combines a relevered beta of 1.45 (from the peer average 
unlevered beta of 0.86) with a MRP of 5.67% and a risk-free rate of 1.77%. The 
financial structure considered a D/EV of 40%, aligned with the medium-term target 
consolidated Net Debt at 3-4x Adjusted EBITDA (company standards). For the 
Chinese segment, a WACC of 9.80% was applied. Despite the lower cost of debt - 
assumed at 3.82% (HIBOR + 1.63%) based on the credit facility incurred in 3Q19 
– the reduced level of indebtness of MGM China (25% D/EV) and the higher cost 
of equity (11.93%) result in a higher cost of capital of the Asian segment. The 
Table 2: Main MGM China Revenue 
Drivers Assumptions 2019-2027 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 3: Peers by Operation (and 
respective Bloomberg Tickers) 
Source: ER Analysis, Bloomberg 
 
Domestic Operations
CZR US Equity Caesars Entertainment Corp
BYD US Equity Boyd Gaming Corp
LVS US Equity Las Vegas Sands Corp
PENN US Equity Penn National Gaming Inc
WYNN US Equity Wynn Resorts Ltd
RRR US Equity Red Rock Resorts Inc
MGM China
1128 HK Equity Wynn Macau Ltd
035250 KS Equity Kangwon Land Inc
GENS SP Equity Genting Singapore Ltd
SKC NZ Equity SKYCITY Entertainment Group Lt
MLCO US Equity Melco Resorts & Entertainment
880 HK Equity SJM Holdings Ltd
TAH AU Equity Tabcorp Holdings Ltd
CWN AU Equity Crown Resorts Ltd
 
 








more intense correlation to the respective relevant market - resulting in an 
average unlevered beta of 1.25 - combines with a higher risk-free rate (3.23% 
Chinese 10y Govt Bond Yield + 0.79% CRP) and MRP (6.31%) for the 
significantly larger cost of equity.  
The forecasted period was 2019-2027, in which both segments are assumed to 
reach steady state. By 2027, the domestic segment is estimated to have FCFs 
growing at 3.4%, with a ROIC of 11.04% - a LT growth of 2.00% was assumed, 
combining inflation expectations with the growth momentum at 2027. The 
Macanese segment is expected to have FCFs growing at 3.1% with a ROIC of 
10.52% - a LT growth rate of 2.70% was assumed, for similar reason as the 
domestic segment. The implications for the consolidated valuation are a WACC of 
7.58%, LT ROIC of 10.96% and a LT growth rate of 2.09%. 
Regarding multiples, the analysis considered 2020e: (i.) EV/EBITDAR, (ii.) 
EV/EBITDA, (iii.) EV/EBIT and (iv.) P/E ratio. The ranges for each multiple present 
the 25 and 75 percentiles of the multiples of selected comparables, and can be 
analyzed in Figure 25: Multiples Valuation – Football Field 
Conclusions 
The Base Case scenario indicates a 6.9% upside in the domestic operations and 
a -5.7% downside in the Chinese segment, resulting in an overall upside of 4.4%, 
with an implicit EV/EBITDA of 11.4x. The combinations of the different scenarios 
on top line assumptions can be seen in Table 5.  
 
Scenario Domestic Operations MGM China
Valuation Upside EV/EBITDA Valuation Upside  EV/EBITDA 
2. Bull 16 066 16,2% 11,9x 6 206 3,6% 10,7x
1. Base 14 775 6,9% 11,6x 5 650 (5,7%) 10,2x
3. Bear 12 251 (11,4%) 10,9x 4 988 (16,8%) 9,5x  
 
Scenarios Domestic Scenarios Domestic
2. Bull 1. Base 3. Bear 2. Bull 1. Base 3. Bear
2. Bull 19 538 18 247 15 723 13,7% 6,2% (8,5%)
1. Base 19 227 17 936 15 412 11,9% 4,4% (10,3%)






The company has historically traded at the bottom of the transaction multiples’ 
ranges, as can been seen in Figure 33. For the domestic segment, the EV/EBIT 
and P/E ratios demonstrate too large of a range, for which they were not the focus 
of the analysis. Nonetheless, this segment trades in the bottom half of all 
multiples. The Chinese segment trades at low EV/EBITDA and EV/EBITDAR 
multiples. The EV/EBIT and P/E multiples are clearly distorted for this segment, 
considering the magnitude of the MGM Cotai PP&E that generates considerable 
Table 4: DCFs Scenario Analysis for Domestic Operations and MGM China (Valuation in $M) 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 5: Scenario Combinations - Consolidated Market Cap ($M) and Upside  
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Figure 32: Valuation Waterfall ($B) 












depreciation and low maintenance capex in the next few years, considering the 













Besides the scenario analysis, a specific sensitivity analysis was conducted for the 
overall Win % at all gambling activities. The variable displayed is the incremental 
impact on the win%, applied on the base case assumptions. As expected, a minor 
impact has tremendous impact on the valuation, although deviations of such sort 
are highly unlikely:  
Similarly, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the overall occupancy rate in the 
company hotels and resorts: 
A sensitivity analysis to LT growth expectations and WACC was also conducted 










All in all, our investment recommendation is a Hold for MGM Resorts 
International, with an expected 4.4% upside. The profitability enhancement 
potential with strong organic growth expected for current casinos is not enough to 
compensate the number of factors that seem too unpredictable (such as the value 
of the potential Osaka IR and the future of the GVC partnership) combined with a 
possibly concerning macroeconomic outlook for a highly cyclical industry, leading 
us to conclude it is better not to “call” or “fold”, but rather “check” MGM’s stock. 
Figure 33: Valuation Football Field – Market Capitalization Ranges ($M) 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis - Overall Win % at Gambling Operations 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis - Overall Occupancy Rate % 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis on LT growth expectations and WACC – Consolidated Market Cap ($M) and Upside 
Source: ER Analysis 
 
Current Market Cap 
(0.25%) (0.10%) +0.00% +0.10% +0.25% (2.0%) (1.0%) +0.00% +1.0% +2.0%
Upside -3,3% 1,5% 4,4% 7,7% 12,5% Upside -0,1% 2,2% 4,4% 6,8% 8,7%
WACC WACC
7,08% 7,33% 7,58% 7,83% 8,08% 7,08% 7,33% 7,58% 7,83% 8,08%
2,29% 22 625 20 670 18 899 17 288 15 817 31,7% 20,3% 10,0% ,6% (7,9%)
2,19% 22 012 20 122 18 409 16 847 15 419 28,1% 17,1% 7,2% (1,9%) (10,3%)
Growth rate % 2,09% 21 422 19 596 17 936 16 421 15 033 24,7% 14,1% 4,4% (4,4%) (12,5%)
1,99% 20 856 19 089 17 481 16 010 14 660 21,4% 11,1% 1,8% (6,8%) (14,7%)
1,89% 20 312 18 601 17 041 15 612 14 300 18,2% 8,3% (,8%) (9,1%) (16,8%)
 
 









Appendix: Financial Statements 
 
Income Statement 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
Revenue 11 763 12 467 13 261 13 876 14 513 14 975 15 334 15 681 16 020 16 368
Casino 5 630 6 040 6 466 6 805 7 181 7 432 7 616 7 793 7 965 8 142
Non-casino 5 471 5 732 6 072 6 323 6 561 6 755 6 916 7 072 7 224 7 381
Corporate and Other 662 695 723 748 771 788 802 816 831 846
(-) Direct Costs (6 913) (7 122) (7 450) (7 684) (7 925) (8 144) (8 329) (8 508) (8 684) (8 872)
(-) Casino (3 200) (3 343) (3 509) (3 634) (3 749) (3 860) (3 949) (4 037) (4 122) (4 214)
(-) Non-casino (3 294) (3 356) (3 510) (3 613) (3 731) (3 831) (3 919) (4 002) (4 085) (4 171)
(-) Corporate expense (419) (423) (431) (436) (445) (453) (461) (469) (478) (486)
Direct Margin 4 851 5 345 5 811 6 193 6 588 6 831 7 005 7 173 7 336 7 496
Direct Margin % 41% 43% 44% 45% 45% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
(-) Reimbursed costs (425) (496) (527) (549) (578) (597) (611) (624) (637) (650)
(-) General & adminstrative (1 765) (1 791) (1 829) (1 865) (1 907) (1 940) (1 984) (2 017) (2 061) (2 106)
Adjusted EBITDA 2 660 3 058 3 456 3 778 4 102 4 294 4 411 4 531 4 638 4 740
Adjusted EBITDA % 22,6% 24,5% 26,1% 27,2% 28,3% 28,7% 28,8% 28,9% 28,9% 29,0%
(-) Preopening and start-up expenses (151) (137) (135) (141) (138) (138) (139) (138) (138) (139)
(-) Non-Core expenses (57) (305) (86) (86) (86) (86) (86) (86) (86) (86)
(+) Income from unconsolidated affiliates 148 151 159 164 172 176 180 184 187 191
EBITDA 2 600 2 767 3 393 3 716 4 051 4 246 4 366 4 491 4 601 4 707
EBITDA % 22% 22% 26% 27% 28% 28% 28% 29% 29% 29%
(-) Depreciation and Amortization (1 178) (1 326) (1 381) (1 436) (1 491) (1 546) (1 602) (1 602) (1 602) (1 602)
EBIT 1 422 1 441 2 012 2 280 2 560 2 700 2 764 2 889 2 999 3 106
(-) Interests (770) (759) (719) (675) (614) (539) (495) (431) (343) (303)
(-) Other non-operating expenses (28) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95) (95)
EBT 625 587 1 198 1 510 1 851 2 066 2 174 2 363 2 562 2 708
(-) Taxes (135) (125) (292) (364) (441) (490) (493) (534) (577) (610)
Net Income 489 461 906 1 147 1 410 1 576 1 681 1 829 1 984 2 098
(-) Comprehensive income attributable to non-controlling interests (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113) (113)
Net Income attributable to MGM 377 349 794 1 034 1 297 1 463 1 569 1 716 1 872 1 985
Balance Sheet 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
Cash and equivalents 1 527 685 663 694 726 750 768 785 898 1 283
Accounts receivable 657 655 690 715 746 768 785 802 818 835
Inventories  111 110 116 115 118 122 123 125 128 131
Income tax receivable  28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prepaid expenses and other 204 200 209 215 221 227 232 237 242 247
Property and equipment 20 730 20 726 20 672 20 568 20 414 20 210 19 955 19 704 19 458 19 215
Goodwill 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821 1 821
Other intangible assets, net 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507 3 507
Other long-term assets 455 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453
Operating deferred tax asset 104 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Investments in and advances to unconsolidated affiliates 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
Assets 29 961 29 005 28 979 28 936 28 856 28 705 28 492 28 283 28 174 28 340
Accounts payable 303 298 311 319 328 336 343 349 356 363
Construction payable  312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 312
Other accrued liabilities  2 151 2 411 2 596 2 745 2 899 3 006 3 084 3 162 3 237 3 314
Operating deferred tax liabilities 1 114 1 179 1 238 1 291 1 340 1 383 1 421 1 459 1 497 1 534
Other long-term obligations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
New Debt 0 1 381 2 904 3 984 5 416 7 253 9 019 9 886 8 670 7 655
Accrued interest on long-term debt  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Long-term debt net 15 110 13 837 11 871 10 155 7 849 4 964 2 079 0 0 0
Noncontrolling interests 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060 4 060
Liabilites 23 448 23 876 23 690 23 265 22 602 21 712 20 717 19 628 18 531 17 637
Net Assets 6 512 5 129 5 289 5 671 6 253 6 993 7 775 8 656 9 643 10 703
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The purpose of the paper is to examine the potential value of the recent legalized Japanese gambling 
market for MGM Resorts International. The macroeconomic and political implications surrounding 
the topic were addressed and how the same implications may influence the attractiveness of the 
expected market. Additionally, the difficultness in quantifying the same market was also discussed, 










































This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR 
Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR Norte 
(Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 
 
 
Introduction and Motivation 
MGM Resorts International [MGM] is on the race for a Japan casino license, following the 
Integrated Resort Promotion Act [IRPA] of 2018, in which the Japanese government legalized 
privately run gambling/casino operations. It was previously forbidden under the Japanese 
Criminal Code. The IRPA’s motivations are associated with the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
government strategy to boost economic growth through the Japanese tourism sector.  
Diverse initiatives have already taken place to fulfill the requirements of foreign visitors coming 
into the Japanese territory. One of these initiatives is the Japan’s bet on 3 large-scale Integrated 
Resorts [IRs] to be developed in the following decade and to be owned by private entities. The 
IR refers to an entertainment complex that incorporates malls, theme parks, hotels, alongside 
casinos.  Despite not being completely consensual under Japanese politicians, the government 
insists that IRs will increase the number of tourists, bring additional income to regional 
government and will also create new jobs. And this is where MGM comes in. The gambling 
company is betting on a deleveraging approach (after several decades of being a highly 
leveraged) in order to raise money for potential key growth opportunities, such as the IR license 
to operate in Japan.  
James Murren, Chief Executive Officer of MGM Resorts International, has already shown full 
commitment to acquire the Japanese license. More specifically, MGM’s strategy “Osaka First”, 
as the name indicates, displays MGM’s total interest to develop a unique Integrated Resort in 
the city of Osaka, spending upward of $10B in its process. After the signature of the so-called 
IR Promotion Act, MGM counted with the competition of all its main peers: Las Vegas Sands, 
Wynn Resorts, Melco Resorts & Entertainment, Caesars Entertainment, Galaxy Entertainment, 
and Genting Group. Nevertheless, only the last one stays on the race for the Osaka spot. Las 
Vegas Sands and Wynn consider Osaka the least desirable spot of all potential locations - 
 
Osaka, Tokyo and Yokohama - given the heavy restrictions proposed by local Japanese 
lawmakers, while Caesars withdrew completely for a license in Japan to focus on its merger 
with Eldorado Resorts. If MGM wins, the (optimistic) plan passes by meeting the March 2025 
opening date, just a couple of months before the opening of Expo ’25 in Osaka. Furthermore, 
MGM has constituted a partnership with Orix Corporation (Japanese diversified financial 
services group that reached the $2.4B net income mark in 2018) in its bid to be selected by the 
city of Osaka. 
Macro and Tourism Trends 
Within Bank of Japan projections1, the Japanese economy is expected to continue the 
expansionary trend at least until 2021. As previously mentioned, the Japanese government has 
been boosting the tourism industry given the confidence it has in its potential impact on GDP. 
According to the Japan Tourism Agency2, in 2018, Japan surpassed the target of 30M incoming 
tourists for the first time, with tourists spending more than $41.5B in goods and services 
(foreign visitors’ spending increased for the seventh consecutive year). And it does not end here 
for the Japanese Government: by the year 2030 the goal was set to reach 60M incoming tourists 
and an inherent spending of $141B. However, when comparing the values for the first half of 
2019 with the values for the previous year period, tourist growth slowed to the single-digit 
figure of +4.2% YoY.  
The main slowdown factors are the fall of the advantage of a weaker yen and the deteriorating 
economic environment of some of the countries that most contribute to Japan's tourist base 
(South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong). According to a study published by KPMG2 in 2019, 
c.60% or more tourists concentrate their visit on the golden route that connects the three largest 
metropolitan areas of the country, leaving out many remote locations to be seen. Moreover, 
according to what has been the position of the Japanese government, the objective now passes 
1. Bank of Japan. 2019. “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1907b.pdf 
2. The Japan Times. 2019. “Foreign Tourists Spent Record ¥4.5 Trillion in Japan in 2018”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/16/national/foreign-tourists-spent-record-¥4-5-trillion-japan-2018/. 
3. KPMG. 2019. “Challenges in Making Japan a Tourism-Oriented Country”. Accessed January 2, 2020.  
https://home.kpmg/jp/en/home/insights/2019/08/hospitality-ir-sector.html 
 
mainly through the reduction of this structural inequality and thus to allow such remote 
locations to start prospering and taking advantage of Japanese tourism growth. For that very 
reason, the following decade will be marked by major boost events: Japan will host the Olympic 
Games’20 and the already mentioned Expo’25, in Osaka. In order to continue the tourism 
growth path after 2025, IR development rises as one the most important sources of growth. The 
fact the Government of Japan is hardly pursuing a status of globally competitive tourist 
destination combining with the economic (and tourism) outlook may help MGM to see its desire 
turn into reality. 
Gambling Framework: Past, Present and Future   
Nowadays, the gambling sector is yet fully controlled by the state and consists only in few 
allowed gambling activities (namely pachinko, horse, motorcycle and motorboat races) that met 
in the past certain criteria to be considered legal.  Despite the restricted scenario of gambling 
games, Japan is seen as a country with a high propensity to gambling addiction: a 2017 health 
ministry survey4 estimates 3.6% (3.2M citizens) of the Japanese population suffer or have 
already suffered from gambling addiction. The percentage stands out when compared, for 
example, with the French (1.2%) or Swiss (1.1%) reality. An argument used and reused by the 
opposition to Abe's government, the Japanese Communist Party, to justify concerns expressed 
about gambling addiction. Something that is "ignored" by the current government, arguing that 
integrated resorts provide an unquestionable set of benefits to the central and local economy. 
The legalization of casinos also marked the ban lifting on the private gambling sector. From a 
political perspective the Japanese government decided that MGM (or any other operator) must 
reinvest 30% of its annual gross profits5 in the IR, promoting a principle of sustained growth: 
continuous investment in IR will lead to continuous increase of the tourist base in a long-term 
basis while serving public purposes through private entities like MGM.   
 
4. The Japan Times. 2017. “An estimated 3.2 million Japanese addicted to gambling”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/30/national/social-issues/estimated-3-2-million-japanese-addicted-gambling/#.Xg3ODXd2vVh. 




Regulators have not yet finalized the set of rules, but it is already consensual for MGM and the 
other operators that the investment will be considerably high; MGM6 has publicly reiterated 
that it expects to invest $10B (or more) based on an expected multibillion-dollar market - an 
official study conducted by the Osaka city government7 estimates that per year 13M new 
tourists will appear and generate figures around $50B for the economy. 
Given the latest regulatory developments, it appears that licenses will be issued on a 10-year 
basis. Compared to the initial 20-year basis licenses in Macau, it seems short to recoup an 
investment as large as $10B. However, Fitch8 expects the investment to be even larger – 
rounding the $15B mark – given the necessary infrastructure (the Osaka IR is expected to be 
on Yumeshima man-made island), amenities and other regulatory needs. However, Fitch agrees 
with MGM’s view regarding the potential of the Japanese gambling market: the rating agency 
estimates the Japanese market to exceed the $10B annual revenue threshold. These are exciting 
expectations for MGM, especially when compared to the Las Vegas Strip market generating 
$6.6B9 annually.  Fitch follows this market size assessment with the estimation that the Osaka 
IR will be able to generate nearly $1B of EBITDA annually, in run-rate. The already publicly 
announced partnership with Orix may facilitate the credit line negotiations with local financial 
institutions, as well as with the contact with future service providers or business partners, 
considering its network and simply for the fact that is also local. All things considered, it is not 
expected that the referred reinvestment constraint (30% of EBITDA) to be an active constraint, 
considering an industry average EBITDA margin of c.20%, meaning a required investment of 
30% * 20% = 6% of revenues, vs. an average capex/revenues industry ratio of 8-9%. Despite 
affecting management teams’ ability to make decisions freely in prone of its investors, therefore 
reducing interest of potential operators, the 6% mark is close to the industry minimums. 
 6. MGM Resorts International. 2019. “MGM Resorts Reaffirms Commitment To Pursuing Integrated Resort In Osaka, Japan”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://investors.mgmresorts.com/investors/news-releases/press-release-details/2019/MGM-Resorts-Reaffirms-Commitment-To-Pursuing-Integrated-
Resort-In-Osaka-Japan/default.aspx 
7. NHK World-Japan. 2019. “NRT Focus: Japan's Controversial Casino Plan”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/editors/3/japanscontroversialcasinoplan/index.html 
8. GGR Asia. 2019. “Japan 10 yr casino permit obstacle for bank finance: Fitch”. Accessed January 2, 2020. 
https://www.ggrasia.com/japan-10-yr-casino-permit-obstacle-for-bank-financing-fitch/ 




Risks and Concerns 
Given Japan's geographical position relative to Macau, it is normal that the subject of possible 
revenue cannibalism in Macau must be addressed by MGM: Japan does not have casinos yet 
but 2018 gross gambling revenue almost equals Macau gaming revenue ($37.5B), with almost 
$30B coming from pachinko10 – another proxy for a strong gambling culture. According to 
industry forecasts11, the Japanese market may not be a big threat for Macau but instead it is 
expected to absorb some market share from South Korea and Russia. This perspective is based 
on the familiarity of Chinese tourist culture and the proximity of Macau's border to the 
mainland. However, IGamiX Consulting12 makes a more conservative reading: the consulting 
group considers the Japanese market must be tracked closely given the Japanese culture of high 
quality of service. 
The other risk is the motivation of Japanese regulators to provide a not-so-long license and 
make it more complicated to get a return on an investment like $10/$15B. The fact that it is still 
a market in regulatory design phase and the market size relies yet in a lot of unknowns, there is 
some rational concern regarding the possibility of the cost not offset the substantial investment. 
Final remarks 
Lastly, with some constraints still unpredictable, the Japanese market is still difficult to quantify 
for its investors. However, given the macroeconomic and political factors as well as the 
potential gambling behavior of the Japanese player, the entry of MGM Resorts International 
can be understood as a wise step for its investors. At first glance, these factors seem to be in 
line for the potential company's success in the Japanese market, but some reserves will always 
exist as long as there are no regulatory conclusions, especially until we can better understand 
the unknowns and, hence, quantify how much the return on investment will likely be. The 
upcoming times will be crucial to the unfolding of the history. 
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